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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we show how to exploit real-time communica-
tion applications to determine the IP address of a targeted
user. We focus our study on Skype, although other real-
time communication applications may have similar privacy
issues. We first design a scheme that calls an identified-
targeted user inconspicuously to find his IP address, which
can be done even if he is behind a NAT. By calling the user
periodically, we can then observe the mobility of the user.
We show how to scale the scheme to observe the mobility
patterns of tens of thousands of users. We also consider the
linkability threat, in which the identified user is linked to his
Internet usage. We illustrate this threat by combining Skype
and BitTorrent to show that it is possible to determine the
filesharing usage of identified users. We devise a scheme
based on the identification field of the IP datagrams to verify
with high accuracy whether the identified user is participat-
ing in specific torrents. We conclude that any Internet user
can leverage Skype, and potentially other real-time commu-
nication systems, to observe the mobility and filesharing us-
age of tens of millions of identified users.
1. INTRODUCTION
The cellular service providers are capable of tracking
and logging our whereabouts as long as our cell phones
are powered on. Because the web sites we visit see our
source IP addresses and cookies, the web sites we fre-
quently visit – such as Google [5] and Facebook [4] – can
also track our whereabouts to some extent. Although
tracking our whereabouts can be considered a major in-
fringement on our privacy, most people are not terribly
concerned, largely because they trust that the cellular
and major Internet application providers will not dis-
close this information. Moreover, these large companies
have privacy policies, in which they assure their users
that they will not make location history, and other per-
sonal information, publicly available.
In this paper, we are not concerned about whether
large brand-name companies can track our mobility, but
instead about whether smaller less-trustworthy entities
∗
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App # Users Dir P2P
Skype 560M ✓ ✓
MSN Live 550M ✗ ✓
QQ 500M ✓ ✓
Google Talk 150M ✗ ✓
Table 1: Number of users claimed by Skype [11],
MSN Live [9], QQ [10], and Google Talk [8] and
for each of these systems, whether it has a direc-
tory service and employs P2P communications.
can leverage the Internet to periodically track our where-
abouts. Is it possible, for example, for an ordinary user
with modest financial resources, operating from his or
her home, to periodically determine the IP address of
a targeted and identified Internet user and to link it
to this user’s Internet activities (e.g., file sharing)? We
will show that the answer to this question is yes!
Real-time communication (e.g., VoIP and Video-over-
IP) is enormously popular in the Internet today. As
shown in Table 1, the applications Skype, QQ, MSN
Live, and Google Talk together have more than 1.6 bil-
lion registered users.
Real-time communication in the Internet is naturally
done peer-to-peer (P2P), i.e., datagrams flow directly
between the two conversing users. The P2P nature of
such a service, however, exposes the IP addresses of all
the participants in a conversation to each other. Specif-
ically, if Alice knows Bob’s VoIP ID, she can establish
a call with Bob and obtain his current IP address by
simply sniffing the datagrams arriving to her computer.
She can also use geo-localization services to map Bob’s
IP address to a location and ISP. If Bob is mobile, she
can call him periodically to observe his mobility over,
say, a week or month. Furthermore, once she knows
Bob’s IP address, she can crawl P2P file-sharing sys-
tems to see if that IP address is uploading/downloading
any files. Thus VoIP can potentially be used to collect
a targeted user’s location. And VoIP can potentially
be combined with P2P file sharing to determine what a
user is uploading/downloading. This would clearly be
a serious infringement on privacy.
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However, for such a scheme to be effective, there are
several technical challenges:
• For a specific targeted individual – such as Bob
Smith, 28 years old, living in Kaiserslautern Ger-
many – can Alice determine with certainty his
VoIP ID?
• Can Alice determine which packets come from
Bob (and thereby obtain his IP address)? Indeed,
during call setup, Alice may receive packets from
many other peers. In addition, can Alice call Bob
inconspicuously, so that Alice can periodically call
Bob and get his IP address without Bob knowing
it? Finally, can Alice obtain Bob’s address, even
when Bob configures his VoIP client to block calls
from Alice?
• If Bob’s IP address, found with VoIP, is the same
as an IP address found in a P2P file-sharing sys-
tem, then we cannot conclude with certainty that
Bob is downloading the corresponding file, since
Bob may be behind a NAT (with the matching IP
address being the public IP address of the NAT).
Thus, is it possible to verify that Bob is indeed
uploading/downloading the files, given that NATs
are widely deployed in the Internet?
In this paper, using Skype, we develop a measurement
scheme to meet all the above challenges. (This may
be possible with other VoIP systems as well, which we
leave for future work.) Our main contributions are the
following:
• We develop a scheme to find a targeted person’s
Skype ID and to inconspicuously call this person
to find his IP address, even if he is behind a NAT.
By carefully studying Skype packet patterns for a
Skype caller, we are able to distinguish packets re-
ceived from the Skype callee from packets received
from many other peers. Having identified these
packets, we extract the callee’s IP address from
the headers of the packets. Furthermore, through
experimentation, we determine how to obtain the
IP address of the callee fully inconspicuously, that
is, without ringing or notifying the user. Finally,
we show that Skype privacy settings fail to protect
against our scheme.
• We show our scheme can be used periodically to ob-
serve the mobility of Skype users. By scaling our
scheme, we demonstrate that Skype does not im-
plement counter measures to hinder such schemes.
Although there are several challenges to measure
the mobility of a large number of users, we show
that it can be done efficiently and effectively.
• We show that the scheme introduces a linkability
threat where the identity of a person can be associ-
ated to his Internet usage. We illustrate this threat
by combining Skype and BitTorrent to show that
it is possible to determine the file-sharing usage of
identified users. One of the challenges here is that
a BitTorrent user is often NATed, so that he may
share his IP address with many other users. When
a common IP address is discovered in both Skype
and BitTorrent, we immediately launch a verifi-
cation procedure in which we simultaneously call
the corresponding user and perform a BitTorrent
handshake to the IP address, port and infohash
(which identifies the file being shared). We then
use the identification field of the IP datagrams to
verify with high accuracy whether an identified
user is participating in specific torrents. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to
show that such a scheme can be used in the wild.
In addition to the technical contributions of this pa-
per, another contribution is that we are alerting Inter-
net users (and the Skype company as discussed in the
next section) of a major privacy vulnerability, whereby
targeted users can have their mobility and Internet us-
age tracked. As of May 2011 (more than six months af-
ter having notified the Skype company), all the schemes
presented in this paper are still valid. We provide
some relatively simple solutions so that future real-time
communication systems can be made less vulnerable to
these attacks.
One solution that would go a long way is to design
the VoIP system so that the callee’s IP address is not
revealed until the user accepts the call. With this prop-
erty, Alice would not be able to inconspicuously call
Bob. Moreover, if Alice is a stranger (that is, not on
Bob’s contact list), and Bob configures his client to not
accept calls from strangers, then this design would pre-
vent any stranger from tracking him, conspicuously or
otherwise. However, even with this solution in place,
any friend of Bob, say Susan, can still call him conspic-
uously and obtain his IP address. Susan could be Bob’s
spouse, parent, employer, or employee, for example. It
would be hard for Susan to periodically track Bob this
way, but Susan could still (i) get Bob’s current loca-
tion, and (ii) check to see if Bob is downloading content
from a P2P file-sharing system. Preventing these at-
tacks would require more fundamental changes in the
VoIP system (specifically, using relays by default) or
more fundamental changes in the underlying Internet
protocols.
This paper is organized as follows. We discuss the le-
gal and ethical considerations of this paper in Section 2.
In Section 3, we describe our scheme to determine the
current IP address of a person using Skype. We then
show that this scheme can be used periodically to ob-
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serve the mobility and file-sharing usage of identified
users in Section 4 and 5. Finally, we discuss some sim-
ple defenses in Section 6, the related work in Section 7,
and we conclude in Section 8.
2. LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS
In this measurement study, all testing involving iden-
tified users has been performed on a small sample of
volunteers who gave us their informed consent to make
measurements and publish results. Unfortunately, the
informed consent process for privacy, as for fraud [25],
may significantly bias user behavior. For example, in-
formed users may stop using Skype or BitTorrent. For
this reason, we also needed to consider a larger sample
of (anonymized) users in order to accurately assess the
amount of personal information that is revealed by a
normal usage, e.g., the mobility and file-sharing usage
of Skype users. For the sake of privacy, we only stored
and processed anonymized mobility and file-sharing in-
formation.
Based on these arguments, the INRIA IRB approved
this study. In the following, we describe our motivation
to run privacy measurements, the tests that we ran with
volunteers, and the remaining measurements.
Motivation for Running Privacy Measurements.
Internet users publish a lot of personal information
that can be exploited in non-trivial ways to invade their
privacy. Indeed, recent research demonstrates that per-
sonal information can be correlated in ways that would
have been hard to anticipate [32]. One goal of this study
is to show that any Internet user can leverage popu-
lar real-time communication applications to observe the
mobility patterns and file-sharing usage of tens of mil-
lions of Internet users. It is important to give public
visibility to these privacy issues, as they constitute se-
rious invasions into users’ privacy, and can potentially
be used for blackmail and phishing attacks.
Volunteers.
In this study, we have relied on two sets of volunteers
for which we have obtained informed consent. The first
set comprises 14 research faculty in the CSE department
at NYU-Poly for which we have attempted to find the
Skype IDs.
The second set comprises 20 people spread through-
out the world (4 in Asia, 2 in Australia, 7 in Europe,
and 7 in USA) in cable and DSL ISPs, with 10 users
directly connectable and 10 users behind NAT. We de-
liberately chose users located in different continents and
with different Internet connectivity to observe a large
diversity of user and client behaviors. We have relied
on the second set of volunteers to (i) determine Skype
packet patterns between caller and callee, (ii) develop
and test inconspicuous calling, and (iii) evaluate the ac-
curacy of mobility measurements. After manual testing,
we called each volunteer 100 times and systematically
observed one of the three packet patterns described in
Section 3 between caller and callee. We also observed
that our inconspicuous calling procedure never notified
them about the calls in any way.
Anonymized users.
We relied on two samples of users for which we did
not store their personal information in this study. We
first used a sample of 10,000 random users to quantify
their mobility. We then used a second sample of 100,000
random users that we used to illustrate a linkability
threat, where the identity of a person can be associated
to his Internet usage (e.g., file sharing).
We always collected the IP addresses of the
anonymized users using inconspicuous calls, which we
validated on the volunteers. Therefore, no human con-
tact was ever made with any of the anonymized users.
Moreover, we processed and stored only anonymized in-
formation, e.g., we anonymized all localization informa-
tion, downloaded content, and we did not store the IP
addresses. Details of all anonymized information are
given in Section 4 and 5.
Other considerations.
In order to conform to the responsible disclosure pro-
cess, we informed the Skype company of our conclusions
in November 2010. In addition, we did not perform any
reverse engineering on Skype binaries. Finally, our mea-
surements generated at most 2.7 calls per second and a
few kilobytes of bandwidth per second, so the load that
we created on the Skype infrastructure was marginal.
3. MAPPING A PERSON TO AN IP AD-
DRESS
In the following, we first describe how to find a tar-
geted person’s Skype ID, that is a unique user ID of a
person in Skype. Then, we present our scheme to find,
based on a Skype ID, the IP address used by this per-
son. We explain how to make this scheme inconspicuous
for the user, and we show that the privacy settings in
Skype fail to protect against our scheme.
3.1 Finding a Person’s ID
When creating a Skype account, a user needs to pro-
vide an e-mail address and Skype ID. The user is also
invited to provide personal information, such as birth
name, location, gender, age, and/or website. This infor-
mation is recorded in the Skype directory. Therefore, in
attempting to define a person’s Skype ID, the obvious
first step is to input into the directory’s search service
the person’s e-mail address or birth name.
When searching for a birth name, Skype will often
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return many results. Along with these results, there is
often side information, such as city and country of resi-
dence. As we will discuss below, if there is still ambigu-
ity about which Skype ID corresponds to the targeted
person, we can, using the methodology described in the
following section, inconspicuously call each of the can-
didate Skype IDs, obtain a current or recent IP address
for each of those IDs, and from the IP addresses deter-
mine current city and ISP (which might be a University
or an employer ISP). Such a procedure often determines
a person’s Skype ID without ambiguity. We briefly re-
mark that if this search was instead based on a service
that doesn’t provide a directory (such as MSN Live or
Google Talk), one may still be able to determine the
ID by scraping homepages, scraping pages from various
social networks, or simply by guessing.
To illustrate that one can easily find the Skype IDs
for a set of identified individuals, we attempt to find the
IDs of the 14 research faculty in the CSE department at
NYU-Poly, all of whom gave us their informed consent.
By searching the corresponding 14 professional e-mail
addresses, we found 2 Skype IDs and by searching the
corresponding 14 birth names, we found 7 additional
IDs with a single match. Among the 5 people for which
we did not find a conclusive Skype ID, there was multi-
ple matching IDs for 4 and no matching Skype ID only
for 1. For the professors with multiple candidate IDs, it
would have been possible to inconspicuously call each
of the candidate IDs (as described below), geo-localize
each candidate, and most likely pinpoint the correct ID.
In summary, among 14 NYU-Poly faculty members, we
found the Skype IDs for nine of them, and we could
have very possibly determined the IDs for four more.
3.2 Finding a Person’s IP Address
We have seen how to find the Skype ID of a targeted
person. We now discuss how, given the person’s Skype
ID, we can find the IP address of the machine on which
that person is currently active. (If the machine is be-
hind a NAT, then we instead obtain the public IP ad-
dress of the NAT.) The basic idea is to call the Skype
ID, receive IP datagrams from the machine on which
that ID is currently logged in, and sniff the packets to
get the machine’s IP address from the IP header. We
describe in the following when this IP address is avail-
able.
When the caller calls a Skype user who is currently
off-line, the Skype application will still provide to the
caller the user’s most recent IP address, as long as the
user was running Skype in the past 72 hours. For this
reason, we are able to retrieve the IP address of a Skype
user that used Skype within the past 72 hours.
By examining traffic patterns to and from a Skype
client when our client makes a call to a Skype ID that
has been active in the past 72 hours, we have observed
that Skype behaves as follows. At the time of the call,
the user may be in one of three possible states (i) the
user is online and not behind a NAT; (ii) the user is
online and behind a NAT; (iii) the user is offline, but
was online (with or without a NAT) within the past
72 hours. (There is also the possibility that the user
is logged in at more than one address simultaneously.
We will discuss that case subsequently.) For case (i),
when the user (callee) is online and not behind a NAT,
the caller will initiate communication with the callee,
sending packets directly to the callee (with the callee’s
IP address in the destination address field of the data-
grams). For case (ii), when the callee is online but be-
hind a NAT, the callee will be instructed (via the callee’s
supernode) to initiate communication to the caller. In
this case, the callee’s public IP address will be in the
source address field of the incoming datagrams. For case
(iii), when the targeted user is offline (but was online
in the past 72 hours), the caller’s Skype client will still
attempt to call the targeted user, using the IP address
that was most recently observed by Skype in the past 72
hours. (If the targeted user is behind a NAT, the caller
will try to initiate a call, using the public IP address
of the NATed user.) In this last case, the callee’s most
recent (public) IP address can be determined from the
IP datagrams. Thus, the callee’s IP address (current
or most recent) can be extracted from the source and
destination fields of IP datagrams.
However, there is a major complication here. In the
process of establishing a call, the call triggers commu-
nication with tens of IP addresses (supernodes and re-
lays). As supernodes and relays are hosted by Skype
users, their IP addresses belong to a multitude of ad-
dress ranges that we cannot just filter out. So it is
complex to determine which Skype datagrams are for
direct communication with the callee. As Skype uses
a proprietary protocol and encrypts the payloads of its
messages, we cannot perform direct packet inspection
to find packets originating from the callee. To solve
this problem, we designed a scheme that relies solely on
the packet patterns between the caller and the various
Skype nodes it is communicating with.
To understand Skype’s traffic, we placed calls to the
second set of volunteers for which we knew the IP ad-
dresses of (see Section 2). We observed three identifiable
patterns of communication that take place between the
caller and callee during the call establishment phase. By
exploiting these patterns, we were able to filter out the
noise, such as communication with supernodes. Fig. 1
shows these three patterns.
We observe the first pattern when the callee is online
and public (case (i)). In that case, the caller will try to
initiate the TCP connection by sending a SYN packet.
We will see in Section 3.3, that we need to drop SYN
packets to make inconspicuous calls. When the TCP
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X
X
X
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(iii)
Figure 1: Communication pattern: (i) callee is
online and public; (ii) callee online and behind
a NAT; (iii) callee is offline. Crosses correspond
to SYN packets that we dropped in order to call
inconspicuously.
timeout occurs, the caller retransmits the SYN, making
two tries after the initial attempt before giving up. The
first timeout interval is 3 seconds and the second is 1
second. In addition to the TCP packets, there are UDP
packets between the caller and the callee. We always
observe three 59 byte or 58 byte packets from caller to
callee, and the intervals between them are 2 seconds and
4 seconds. Thus, between caller and callee there is a spe-
cific traffic pattern, which is shown in Fig. 1 (i). There
is also communication between caller and supernodes;
however, the communication with non-callees does not
exhibit the pattern in Fig. 1 (i). In summary, by identi-
fying the IP address that has packets with the pattern
in Fig. 1 (i), we identify the IP address of the callee. We
remark that the TCP packets and UDP packets don’t
always appear sequentially. Most of the time, they are
mixed.
The second pattern is observed when the callee is
online but behind a NAT (case (ii)), that is, the caller
cannot initiate communication with the callee. In that
case, we have observed that the callee will send a 28
byte UDP packet to the caller. The caller replies with
the same size UDP packet. Next, the caller and callee
will exchange UDP packets of varying sizes. After about
10 seconds, the callee sends 3 byte UDP packets to the
caller. We do not observe these 3 byte UDP packets
from any other source besides the callee. The pattern
is shown in Fig. 1 (ii).
The last pattern occurs when the callee is offline but
has been online in the past 72 hours. In that case, the
caller still attempts to call the user at its last-seen IP
address. The pattern is shown in Fig. 1 (iii). Note
this pattern has the same structure as that of case (i)
except now there is no response from the callee, since
it is offline.
To make things even more complicated, a Skype ID
can be simultaneously online at more than one machine.
In this case, for each online machine either the pattern
in Fig. 1 (i) or (ii) will occur once for each online ma-
chine. We developed a script that searches for the var-
ious patterns and identifies the callee’s IP address(es).
3.3 Inconspicuous calling
In the following, we define the tracking client as the
Skype client we use to exchange packets with a callee.
The tracking client is an actual Skype client controlled
by a script via the Skype API. Importantly, each of the
tracking client is not behind a NAT and, therefore, has
a public IP address. Therefore, communication between
each tracking client and any user (NATed or not) will
always be P2P rather than relayed.
Whenever a Skype call comes in, it is accompanied
with a ring and a pop-up window for notification. The
callee then chooses to accept, reject, or ignore the call.
(We use the terminology “user” and “callee” inter-
changeably, depending on context.) Since the track-
ing client actually makes calls to callees, if not de-
signed carefully, it will cause ringing and pop ups on
the callees’ machines. Not only would this disturb the
callee, but it would expose the attacker. We therefore
need to design our scheme so the tracking client ex-
changes packets directly with the callee – without noti-
fying the callee of the call.
In our testing, we have observed that during call es-
tablishment, both TCP and UDP packets are sent be-
tween the tracking client and the callee. We have found
that if we prevent TCP connections from being estab-
lished with the callee, the callee will not be notified
about the call. Thus, a possible simple solution is to
have the tracking client drop all TCP SYN packets sent
to and from the callee. However, at the time when we
make the call, we have no clue about the callee’s IP
address, and we cannot tell whether an observed TCP
SYN is going to (or coming from) a Skype infrastruc-
ture node, a supernode, a relay node, or the targeted
callee.
To solve this problem, during each call, we prevent
the establishment of any new TCP connection by drop-
ping all outgoing and incoming SYN packets (to all IP
addresses). Note this procedure does not terminate the
tracking client’s TCP connections that were in progress
before making the call (for example, an ongoing con-
nection to a supernode). With this simple mechanism,
the callee is never notified, even if the callee is behind a
NAT. To check that no pop ups appear, we tested this
scheme on the volunteers as described in Section 2.
3.4 Skype Privacy Settings
Skype has two privacy settings to block calls from
specific people. The first setting, allows call from people
in my Contact list only, is a white list. The second
setting called blocked people is a black list blocking all
people whose Skype ID is in this list.
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We tested the impact of both settings on our scheme
to inconspicuously get the IP address of a callee. For
the first setting, the caller was not in the contact list of
the callee. For the second setting, the callee explicitly
blocked the Skype ID of the caller. In both cases, we
were able to inconspicuously retrieve the IP address of
the callee. In summary, we observed that Skype privacy
settings fail to protect against our scheme.
4. MOBILITY OF SKYPE USERS
In the previous section, we presented a scheme to map
a person’s name to an IP address. We now investigate
whether our scheme can be used to periodically observe
the mobility patterns of large sets of Internet users.
4.1 Mobility of a Volunteer
4.1.1 Geo-Localize Skype Users
In the following, we use MaxMind [6] to geo-localize
the IP addresses that are obtained from the tracking
client, hence providing us with the location of users.
MaxMind is a service that, given an IP address, pro-
vides a city, country, and AS. To determine city and
country, it first aggregates known IP locations from
websites that ask their users to provide their geographic
location. Then, it uses various heuristics to interpolate
the location of other IP addresses. MaxMind claims
that it achieves 99.8% accuracy at the country level
and 83% on a city level for the US within a radius of 25
miles.
Apart from our set of volunteers, for the sake of user
privacy, we anonymized (using a salted hash) all loca-
tion information. Therefore, we can tell when users
change locations at the city, AS or country scale, but
not where they actually are.
4.1.2 Example
To give a concrete idea of the kind of mobility that
can be observed, we plot in Fig. 2 the mobility of a user
in our second set of volunteers. (This volunteer has
seen the paper and has given us his consent for all the
information about him disclosed.) This person makes
publicly available his birth name, gender, date of birth,
language, and city of residence in Skype. By searching
his birth name and city on Facebook and LinkedIn, we
are able to determine his profession and employer.
We now briefly describe the mobility of this user. He
confirmed to us that during our measurement period he
was first visiting a university in New York; he then took
a vacation in Chicago; then returned to university and
lodged in Brooklyn; and finally returned to his home in
France. Fig. 2 gives an accurate description of the real
mobility of this user during the measurement period.
The Manhattan location corresponds to an Internet cafe
(confirmed by the user).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Offline
University,NY
Brooklyn,NY
Manhattan,NY
Chicago,IL
France
Mobility of a Volunteer
Time (days)
Figure 2: Example of mobility of a volunteer.
We remark that if we had followed the mobility of the
Facebook friends of this user as well, we likely would
have determined who he was visiting and when. In con-
clusion, mobility combined with information from social
networks can provide a vivid picture of the daily activ-
ities of a targeted user. It is, in our opinion, a major
privacy concern for users of real-time communication
systems.
Whereas this volunteer has an active mobility pat-
tern well suited for our illustrative purpose, a legitimate
question is whether it is possible to observe mobility for
any Skype user. We answer this question in the follow-
ing.
4.2 Mobility of the Anonymized Users
We now describe how to scale our scheme to measure
the availability and mobility of a representative sample
of anonymized Skype users. To confirm the frequent
mobility of Skype users, these users indeed need to be
often running Skype and from several locations. In ad-
dition, we are also interested in evaluating the cost of
scaling our scheme and in examining whether Skype
employs counter measures to hinder it.
For the sake of privacy, we anonymized (as described
in section 4.1.1) all location information, and we do
not store IP addresses. Therefore, we can only report
aggregated statistics, and not detailed user location in-
formation.
4.2.1 Obtaining Millions of Skype IDs
In the following, we show that one can easily retrieve
a large number of Skype IDs along with the personal
information associated with these IDs. To this end, we
use the Skype API to collect the IDs. For each ID, we
check whether the birth name and other personal infor-
mation is available. We do not store this information,
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but instead just note whether it is available in the Skype
user’s profile.
The Skype public API provides a mechanism for third
party applications to control a Skype client. This API
operates as follows. After registering with the Skype
client, the application can send to the client plain text
commands such as search and call. The Skype client
then returns plain text messages to the application. In
particular, the Skype API has a search users command
that takes a search string as a parameter and returns
a list of users whose ID, birth name, or e-mail address
matches the string. If the search string contains @, the
search is performed by e-mail address and has to be an
exact match. If the search string is a valid Skype ID,
the search is performed on the birth name and ID. Oth-
erwise, the search is made on the birth name only. In
addition to the Skype ID of a user, this command will
return any other personal information that the user pro-
vided at registration, such as birth name, age, gender,
homepage, country, language, and other identifying in-
formation.
To build our search strings, we use a set of 580K
birth names that we collected on Facebook using a sim-
ilar technique as the one described by Tang et al. [29].
This set is made up of 66K first names and 156K last
names. We then combine the birth names, first names,
and last names, to obtain 802K unique search strings.
For each of these search strings, we send the search
users command, which typically returns a long list of
users, some of whom didn’t specify birth names. We
then aggregated these lists together and obtained 13M
Skype IDs together with which identifying information
was available in the profile. For these 13M Skype IDs,
88% provide their birth names and 82% provide either
age, gender, homepage, country or language identifying
information (we only store a binary information indicat-
ing whether a user has provided a given personal infor-
mation). We note that even though we used Facebook
to build our search strings, we could use any database
of first and last names.
4.2.2 Parallel Calling
From the Skype IDs obtained in the previous section,
we select 100,000 Skype IDs at random. From these
100,000 IDs, we then determine (using the techniques
discussed in Section 3) that 10,000 Skype IDs (10%)
have been active in the past 72 hours. Finally, we call
these 10,000 Skype IDs on an hourly basis. From this
result based on a random sample of 100,000 Skype users,
we can extrapolate that we can retrieve the IP address
of approximately 10% of all Skype users at any time,
which represents 56 million of users at any moment in
time. We now describe the methodology to call the
10,000 Skype IDs.
We deploy several tracking clients in parallel, each
of which calls a subset of the 10,000 Skype IDs. The
tracking client calls sequentially all the Skype IDs in
its subset, and then repeats the procedure every hour.
We determine the IP address of each called Skype ID
using the inconspicuous call methodology described in
Section 3.3. Based on this IP address we compute the
anonymized location of the user as described in sec-
tion 4.1.1.
Scaling our scheme is challenging. To be able to call
10,000 users on an hourly basis, we need to deploy many
tracking clients in parallel, with each one sequentially
making one call after another. In order to keep the
number of parallel tracking clients to a reasonable level,
the time s between two successive calls for a given client
should be short.
Indeed, there is an important tradeoff in considering
an appropriate value for s. Consider that the tracking
client calls one user, waits s seconds, terminates the call,
and then repeats the process with another user. If s is
large, our tracking client will call users at a relatively
low rate. If s is too small, we may terminate the call
before the packet pattern is initiated, in which case we
may incorrectly assign the IP address of the subsequent
Skype ID to the current Skype ID. Thus, special care
must be taken to associate the IP addresses with the
correct Skype IDs.
The simplest approach is, before making the subse-
quent call, to wait long enough so that the complete
packet pattern elapses. Normally, this takes about 15
seconds from when the first packet is observed until the
whole packet pattern occurs. But if we wait 15 seconds
between each call, only 4 Skype IDs per minute can be
probed.
To increase the calling rate, we performed further
tests and observed that (a) once a packet pattern starts,
it completes even if the call is terminated before comple-
tion; (b) all packet patterns begin within three seconds
after making the call. Based on these observations, by
waiting three seconds before calling a new Skype ID, we
always see the pattern beginning before the end of the
three second interval, and also see the pattern complete
(extending beyond the 3 seconds). To verify claim (a),
we randomly pick 500 users from our Skype ID pool,
and call them using two different values of s: 3 seconds
and 20 seconds. After comparing the mappings gener-
ated from the two approaches, we observe that they are
identical for all 500 random Skype users. This implies
that the interval of 3 seconds is sufficiently large; we
therefore use s = 3 seconds in our measurements.
To validate the accuracy of our scalable calling
scheme, every 100 calls, we call a random Skype ID
among our second set of volunteers (see Section 2). We
stress that these volunteers were not in the contact list
of the tracking clients, so the patterns generated when
calling them are identical to those of the other 10,000
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users we are calling. On the 1,368 calls that we made
when volunteers were online, we observed only 4 false
positives (0.3%) due to patterns that have been re-
ordered during parallel calling. By assigning each IP
address to the only Skype user that is the most often
designated by the packet patterns, we were able to re-
move all false positives.
4.2.3 Cost of the Scaling
To call 10,000 users on a hourly basis, we run our
tracking clients on 30 physical machines, each one with
a different IP address. Each physical machine runs one
Skype client and can call 340 IDs per hour. We estimate
the costs of running this measurement on a cloud com-
puting platform such as EC2 [1] to be approximately
$500 per week.
Preliminary tests suggest that it would have been
possible to increase the number of called users by one or-
der of magnitude with virtualization. Indeed, the main
issue we faced is that running several tracking clients
on a machine makes it harder to isolate packets from
each client. One solution we tested but did not use in
our scheme, is to run several tracking client per physi-
cal machine, each client in a different virtual machine.
Because the goal in this paper is to demonstrate the
feasibility of our scheme and not to fully optimize it,
running a single tracking client per machine is sufficient.
4.2.4 Measurement Results
Whether our scalable calling scheme actually cap-
tures the mobility of a significant fraction of Skype users
depends on three questions that we address in the fol-
lowing.
1) Is it possible to periodically call a large number of
Skype users? In Fig. 3 (left), we see that at any given
time, we are calling between 2, 000 and 3, 000 online
users among the 10,000 users. The diurnal behavior is
due to the heterogeneous distribution of Skype users
worldwide. A large fraction of Skype users are from the
US and Western Europe. So during the daytime in the
US and Western Europe, there are more Skype users
online than during night in these geographical areas.
We also see in Fig. 3 (left) that after two weeks, we have
found at least one current IP address for 9, 500 users,
which represents 95% of the users we were periodically
calling. In summary, it is possible to periodically call a
large number of Skype users.
2) How often are Skype users online? We define avail-
ability as the fraction of the time a given user is online.
In Fig. 3 (middle), we plot the CDF of availability for
the 9,500 Skype users that we have seen online at least
once. Skype users are surprisingly available with 20%
of all users available more than 50% of the time. One
explanation for this behavior is that the Skype clients
starts automatically at the startup of the system. In
summary, Skype users are highly available so one can
call them to collect their location most of the time.
3) Can Skype users be found in several locations? Mo-
bility results in a change of IP address geo-localized in
a different city, AS, and/or country. For each user that
is online at least once, we determine the different loca-
tions he visits over the two-week period. This location
information is anonymized (see section 4.1.1). In Fig. 3
(right), we see that 40% of the 9,500 Skype users change
city, 19% change AS, and 4% change country at least
once in two weeks. In summary, Skype users run Skype
from several locations so one can observe their mobility.
In summary, Skype users often run Skype from differ-
ent locations, and this mobility can be tracked by our
methodology.
Our methodology to measure the number of locations
of a user has two limitations. First, in some cases (e.g.,
dynamic IP address), MaxMind might erroneously as-
sociate a same user to different locations. We believe
that such errors are very unlikely at the scale of a coun-
try or an AS, and only occurs rarely at the scale of
cities so that it does not significantly impact our con-
clusions (see Section 4.1.1). Second, the IP address may
not capture the location of users running Skype on their
mobile phones [17]. Although this may impact our abil-
ity to track Skype users in the future, we believe that
relatively few users fall into this category today.
We may observe that significantly more users are mo-
bile among cities than among ASes for two reasons.
First, some ISPs have broad geographical coverage, so
users located in those ISPs are likely to move within the
same ISP, even though they change city. Second, some
ISPs provide country-wide free Wifi hotspots to their
users. When users of such ISPs change of city, they are
likely to use these hotspots, thus connecting from the
same AS but a different city.
We note that, as the accuracy of IP geo-localization
improves, it will be possible to determine the locations
of users with much finer granularity. For instance, a
recent paper shows that it is possible to geo-localize IP
addresses with a median error distance of 690 meters
[30].
5. FILE-SHARING USAGE OF SKYPE
USERS
In the previous sections, we established that it is pos-
sible to map a person to his IP address in a scalable
manner. We are now interested in validating that this
scheme introduces a linkability threat where the identity
of a person can be associated to his Internet usage. In
particular, we focus in this section on finding the iden-
tity of file-sharing users. We focus on the BitTorrent
application; however, other P2P applications – such as
eMule [3] or Xunlei [12] – could instead be used.
One of the challenges here is that many file-sharing
8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
Number of Online Skype Users Tracked in Time
Time (days)
N
um
be
r o
f u
se
rs
 
 
Cumulated
Simultaneous
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Availability of Skype Users
Availability
CD
F 
of
 u
se
rs
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
100
101
102
Number of Locations per Login
Login rank
N
um
be
r o
f l
oc
at
io
ns
 (lo
g)
 
 
IP
AS
City
Country
Figure 3: (left) Number of simultaneous and cumulative unique online Skype users (of 10,000) called
in two weeks. (middle) CDF of availability of Skype users. (right) Number of locations visited in
two weeks by each Skype user, sorted by decreasing number of locations. Skype users are mobile.
users are NATed, that is, they may share their IP ad-
dress with several users. We present in the following
a scheme exploiting the identification field in the IP
datagrams to check whether two different applications
actually run on the same machine. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first ones to run and validate
such a scheme in the wild.
In this section, we anonymized (as described in sec-
tion 4.1.1) all localization information, we do not store
IP addresses after the verification procedure, and we
never store any information (including the infohash and
the content name) related to the contents downloaded
by a given user.
5.1 Methodology
Our measurement system comprises a Skype tracker,
an Infohash crawler, a BitTorrent crawler, and a Ver-
ifier which communicate through shared storage. We
begin by randomly selecting a set of 100,000 identified
Skype users. The Skype tracker employs ten tracking
clients to daily collect the IP address for the 100,000
users. The Infohash crawler determines the infohashes
(file identifiers) of the 50,000 most popular BitTorrent
swarms. Operating in parallel with the Skype tracker,
the BitTorrent crawler collects the IP addresses partic-
ipating in the 50,000 most popular swarms, and deter-
mines the IP addresses found in both Skype and BitTor-
rent. Finally, the Verifier attempts to initiate P2P com-
munications with the two applications in order to verify
that the same user is indeed running both of them. In
the following, we describe in more detail the operation
of each component. The operation of the Verifier will
be described in Section 5.3.
The Skype Tracker.
We use the methodology developed in Section 3 and
Section 4 to find 100,000 active Skype users. In or-
der to daily call 100,000 Skype users, the Skype tracker
uses ten tracking clients. Because we are now not in-
terested in fine grain mobility measures but instead in
file-sharing usage, we only call each user once per day.
We then analyze packet patterns to determine the lat-
est IP address of these users and temporarily save them
to a shared storage. (Keep in mind we collect the IP
addresses not only of users that are online but also of
all users that have logged into the system in the last 72
hours.) These IP addresses are then loaded from the
shared storage by the BitTorrent crawler to determine
which files are distributed from these IP addresses.
The Infohash Crawler.
We collect file identifiers (infohashes) from the Pub-
licBitTorrent tracker [14], which is the largest BitTor-
rent tracker at the time of this writing. PublicBitTor-
rent publishes a file with all the infohashes it tracks on
its website. This file is the dump of a request, scrape-all,
supported by trackers running the OpenTracker soft-
ware [19]. This request returns all infohashes of files
it is tracking and the number of downloaders (leech-
ers) and uploaders (seeds). We download this file every
day from the PublicBitTorrent website and extract the
infohashes for the 50,000 most popular files.
The BitTorrent Crawler.
In this step, we seek an efficient mechanism to obtain
the IP addresses participating in the 50,000 most popu-
lar torrents. BitTorrent trackers such as PublicBitTor-
rent support a request, announce started, that returns
a list of peers participating in a torrent identified by an
infohash. As tracker developers became aware that such
requests can be abused they started to limit the number
of requests a given peer can send before being black-
listed. Therefore, instead of using the PublicBitTorrent
tracker to collect IP addresses, we use a decentralized
tracker (DHT).
We collect the IP addresses participating in the top
50,000 torrents from the Mainline DHT every hour for
9
two weeks. This DHT is a decentralized tracker that is
primarily used by µTorrent [7] and Mainline BitTorrent
[2], the most popular BitTorrent clients. However, we
note that other popular P2P file-sharing clients, such
as Xunlei, also support it.
When a peer wants to download a new file, it contacts
the Mainline DHT to obtain a list of peers distributing
that file. This peer first finds the DHT node main-
taining the list of peers for that file using the find node
request. That request takes an infohash as a parameter,
and essentially returns the ID and (IP, port) pair of the
DHT node responsible for that infohash. Then, the peer
sends a get peers request to that node, which returns a
list of (IP, port) pairs belonging to peers distributing
the file.
Unlike centralized trackers, we observed that DHT
nodes do not implement blacklisting strategies. So we
located the nodes responsible for the 50,000 files that
we wanted to crawl and then repeatedly sent get peers
requests to collect the peers distributing these files.
The whole procedure distributed over 10 machines takes
about one hour.
Each of our crawling bots periodically loads the
(Skype ID, IP) pair of active Skype users into memory.
If the IP address of an active Skype user is also found in
a BitTorrent swarm, the user is possibly downloading
the corresponding file (this correlation is performed on-
the-fly and we never store the mapping IP address, in-
fohash). However, we must verify this hypothesis as an
IP address may correspond to a NAT shared by several
users. We refer to this problem as the NAT problem.
We note that several types of middleboxes, including
NATs and IPv6 routers can use a single public IP ad-
dress for different users. For the sake of simplicity, we
use the term NATs when we refer to the generic notion
of middleboxes in the following. (We note that dynamic
IP addresses can also be shared by several users, result-
ing in the same problem.)
5.2 The NAT Problem
Depending on the Internet connectivity of a user, an
IP address may correspond to a computer or to a NAT
shared by a household, a company, or even an ISP.
Because several users can share the same IP address,
we may wrongly associate an identified Skype user to
the BitTorrent downloads of another user behind the
same NAT. To the best of our knowledge, all BitTorrent
clients multiplex torrents on a single port. This port is
picked at random at the installation of the client, and
remains the same in subsequent utilizations. Therefore,
we can associate each IP/port pair to a single BitTor-
rent user [19]. However, this observation alone does not
allow us to match a Skype user to a BitTorrent user
when the user is behind a NAT, as described below.
We found 15,000 users (out of 100,000) who have IP
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Figure 4: CDF of the users using BitTorrent
as a function of BitTorrent ports. 50% of col-
lected BitTorrent users share their IP address
with other BitTorrent users.
addresses that were simultaneously found in Skype and
BitTorrent during a period of two weeks. Of these
15,000 Skype users using BitTorrent, approximately
7,500 (50%) share their IP address with another Bit-
Torrent user (as indicated by users with more than one
port in Fig. 4). In other words, a significant fraction
of the 15,000 Skype users are behind a NAT and may
therefore not be the ones using BitTorrent (false posi-
tives).
5.3 The Verifier
We now describe the operation of our Verifier tool,
which is responsible for definitively establishing whether
Skype and BitTorrent are run on the same machine. Al-
though more than one person simultaneously share the
same machine, the granularity of a machine is enough
for our purpose. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
in the following that each machine is used by a single
person.
Given an IP address that participates in both Skype
and BitTorrent (matching IP), we now describe how
the Verifier makes sure the person identified in Skype
is indeed the one using BitTorrent. Consider a scenario
where two users, Alice and Bob, are behind the same
NAT. Suppose that, by calling Alice on Skype, we have
determined that her IP address is in a swarm in BitTor-
rent, but the IP address is a NATed one. Two scenarios
are possible. In the first scenario, Alice is using both
Skype and BitTorrent on the same host. In the second
scenario, Alice is using Skype on one host and Bob is
using BitTorrent on another host. The second scenario
corresponds to a false positive because Alice is not the
one using BitTorrent.
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To detect false positives, we leverage the predictabil-
ity of the identification field in the IP datagrams (IP-
ID) originating from the same machine [18]. As soon as
the BitTorrent crawler detects a matching IP address,
it signals the Verifier, which immediately calls the cor-
responding Skype user and, at the same time, initiates
a handshake with the BitTorrent client. If the distance
between the IP-IDs generated by Skype and those gen-
erated by BitTorrent is small, Alice is very likely to be
the identified BitTorrent downloader. Otherwise, Alice
is likely to be a false positive.
At the end of the verification procedure, IP addresses
are anonymized using a salted hash. All subsequent
analysis is performed on this anonymized data.
Limitations.
Our verification procedure has two limitations. The
first limitation is that we can only initiate communica-
tion to public peers or NATed peers that accept incom-
ing communications (e.g., when UPnP is used). This
limitation significantly restricts the number of BitTor-
rent users we can verify. However, for this proof of
concept, it is not necessary to verify all the Skype users
who are downloading with BitTorrent. An aggressive
attacker could easily verify more users by registering the
IP address of the Verifier to the Mainline DHT. In this
manner he would also receive incoming communication
from peers whose NATs refuse incoming communica-
tions. Therefore, an attacker could in principle verify
NATed peers also.
The second limitation is that we assume that the IP-
IDs originating from the same machine are predictable,
which depends on two conditions. The first condition
is that the IP-IDs originating from the same machine
should be predictable (e.g., sequential). Because IP-
IDs are attributed by the TCP stack of an Operating
System (OS), this first condition highly depends on the
fraction of OSes observed in the wild whose attribution
is indeed predictable. By testing Windows XP, Vista,
and 7, we verified that they all use sequential IP-IDs.
As these three versions of Windows alone account for
90% of all OSes found in the wild [13], we conclude that
this first condition is largely met. The second condition
is that NATs do not modify the IP-IDs as attributed
by the TCP stack of the machine. This condition is
supported by (i) related work in which this behavior was
not observed in practice [18] and by (ii) the specification
of the IPv4 ID field, which specifies that NATs should
ignore this field [15].
In conclusion, we expect that our verification proce-
dure based on the predictability of the IP-ID field to be
highly accurate, that is, with no, or few, false positives
(due to similar IP-IDs originating from different ma-
chines) and relatively few false negatives (due to OSes
with unpredictable IP-IDs attribution or IPv6 routers
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Figure 5: After two weeks, we plot the 90th per-
centile of the shortest distance between the IP-
IDs on a ring of 216 elements of the first Skype
and BitTorrent packets received from a verifi-
able user, sorted by increasing 90th percentile
(curve). There is one dot per verification exper-
iment. We verify 400 users out of 765 users.
that re-attribute IP-IDs unpredictably).
5.4 Experimental Results
By running our verification procedure for two weeks,
we successfully triggered communication between the
Verifier and 765 unique users on both Skype and Bit-
Torrent. We refer to these users as verifiable.
We investigate the fraction of verifiable users that we
actually fully verified. For the 765 verifiable users, we
compute the shortest distance on a ring of 216 elements
between the IP-IDs of the first packet received from
Skype and from BitTorrent. The smaller the distance,
the more likely the identified Skype user is indeed using
BitTorrent. In Fig. 5, we see that running this proce-
dure finds 400 unique users for whom the 90th percentile
of the distance is less than 1,000. We conclude that ap-
proximately 400 users (52% of the 765 verifiable users)
are indeed using BitTorrent. We cannot conclude for
sure that the remaining 48% of the verifiable users are
not BitTorrent users (they might be false negatives).
However, as we have seen that at least 90% of the OSes
use sequential IP-IDs, we strongly believe that most of
them are not using BitTorrent.
In summary, we have determined 400 identified Skype
users (from a random set of 100,000) who are definitely
using BitTorrent. Table 2 shows the information that
is readily available about the top-10 BitTorrent users.
When registering with Skype, all of these users provided
their last names and all but two users also provided
their first names. In addition, all but one of these users
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Rank # Files First name Last name City Country
1 23 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
2 18 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
3 12 ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
4 11 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
5 11 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
6 11 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
7 9 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
8 8 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
9 7 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
10 6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 2: For each of the top10 verified user, we
show the number of files shared by that user,
whether the user provides in its Skype profile a
first or last name, a city, and a country.
provided their cities of residence. However, we remind
that we do not store any personal information (e.g.,
name and city) for the purpose of this measurement;
instead, we only store a binary information indicating
whether a personal information is available or not.
6. DEFENSES
In the previous sections we have seen that it is possi-
ble for an attacker to develop and deploy (possibly from
a home) a tool that periodically determines the current
IP address of a targeted VoIP user. Even if the VoIP
user is behind a NAT, the attacker can determine the
user’s public IP address. Observing the mobility of a
targeted individual could be used for many malicious
purposes. In this section we briefly discuss defenses for
this attack, both at the application level and at the user
level.
One measure that can go a long way is for the design-
ers of the VoIP signaling protocol to simply ensure that
the callee’s IP address is not revealed to the caller un-
til the callee accepts the call. That is, before the callee
accepts the call, callee’s signaling packets are sent to su-
pernodes or infrastructure nodes, and not to the caller;
furthermore, the caller is not provided the callee’s IP
address during call set-up. By only revealing the callee’s
IP address after the callee accepts the call, then (i) it is
no longer possible to make an inconspicuous call to the
target; and (ii) if Alice chooses to block all calls from
strangers (i.e., people not on her contact list), then a
stranger will no longer be able to determine her IP ad-
dress and observe her mobility. This solution has a
very low overhead as only a few signalling messages are
relayed. Thus, we strongly recommend that all VoIP
applications adopt this simple mechanism.
However, even with this simple mechanism in place,
a friend of Alice (that is, anyone on her contact list,
including friends, old boyfriends, family members, em-
ployers, and employees) would still be able to determine
her IP address (and location) when they call her and she
accepts the call. We now outline some measures that
defend against this attack.
One blanket defense for these attacks is to have all
calls pass through relays. When a datagram passes
through a relay, the relay regenerates the datagramwith
the source IP address of the relay. If the relay can be
trusted, then neither party in the call sees the other’s
IP. In fact, in Skype, if both caller and callee are be-
hind a NAT, then the call is typically relayed through
a third skype user (who is not behind a NAT), serv-
ing as a relay. The relays must be selected so as not
to give away the location of the callee. (For example,
the system shouldn’t strive to find a relay in same city
as the callee.) The main problem with this solution is
that it detracts from the efficiencies of P2P communi-
cation because (i) relays must now be made available
to support the huge bandwidth demands of large-scale
real-time voice and video communication systems; and
(ii) access ISPs will see an increase of upstream and
downstream relay traffic.
In order to not excessively route traffic through re-
lays, the system can be designed so that Alice can spec-
ify for which contacts in her address book the calls are
to be routed through relays. For example, if Alice is
only concerned about her boss observe her mobility, she
can configure her client to have calls between her and
her boss pass through relays. The client could also be
designed to make this decision on a call-by-call basis:
whenever, her boss attempts to call her, she is asked
whether this should be a P2P or relayed call.
We briefly mention that another approach for provid-
ing location privacy is to run the P2P communication
application through a third-party anonymizing service
such as Tor [22]. However, the delay and throughput
performance of Tor and similar services is clearly insuf-
ficient for supporting real-time voice and video [21,24].
In addition to being inefficient, Tor also introduces pri-
vacy issues for certain applications (e.g., P2P file shar-
ing) [20].
We conclude this brief discussion on defenses by men-
tioning that these location attacks actually have their
roots in the current Internet architecture, for which all
datagrams carry source and destination IP addresses.
We are not advocating a total re-design of the Internet,
but we mention that this and other Internet privacy
problems could be resolved by using alternative under-
lying network architectures. For example, if the Inter-
net were to use virtual circuits (as with X.25 and ATM),
then it would be much more difficult for a stranger or
a friend to observe a user’s mobility.
7. RELATED WORK
7.1 Mobility
We now describe the related work on observing the
mobility of users by using IP addresses and cell phones.
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IP Address Mobility.
Guha et al. [23] is the work on IP address mobility
that is the closest to ours. The authors show that by
periodically retrieving the IP address of dynamic DNS
users, an attacker can observe the mobility of these
users. Whereas the goal of their attack is similar to
ours, there are two major differences between exploit-
ing dynamic DNS and Skype to measure mobility. First,
dynamic DNS allows to infer the identify of the user
in “some cases” whereas we have showed that 88% of
Skype users provide their birth name, and that 82% also
provide either age, gender, homepage, country, or lan-
guage. Second, targeting dynamic DNS users limits the
scope of the attack. Whereas there are a few millions
users of dynamic DNS in the world, we showed that
much more Skype users are susceptible to have their
mobility tracked.
Cell Phone Mobility.
The Carmen Sandiego Project [16] recently showed
how to use cell phones to observe the mobility of a user.
The authors first use the caller ID service to collect
persons-to-cell phone numbers mappings. Then, by ac-
cessing the Home Location Register (HLR), they show
that an attacker can collect the current Mobile Switch-
ing Center (MSC) identifier for a given phone number.
As MSC identifiers often gives the indication of the lo-
cation of a user, an attacker can periodically collect
that information to observe the mobility of an iden-
tified cell phone user. One important weakness of this
attack is that there is no convention on how an operator
attributes MSC identifiers. So the naming convention
for MSCs varies from one operator to the other and it
is hard to determine to which location a given identifier
corresponds.
Even though it is not our primary purpose, we believe
our scheme, and in particular the description of Skype
packet patterns between caller and callee, also has the
potential to significantly simplify the tracing of Skype
calls.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show
that it is possible to use real-time applications to map
a person to an IP address and to scale that scheme
to observe the mobility of a large number of persons.
As we have shown it might be possible to observe the
mobility of 56 million identified Skype users worldwide
at any moment in time, we claim that the scope and
the severity of our attack are very severe.
7.2 File-sharing Usage
We now describe the related work on observing file-
sharing usage and verifying users. Because we have used
BitTorrent in this paper and it is one of the most pop-
ular file-sharing system, we focus on BitTorrent in the
following. However, we remind that all file-sharing sys-
tems are in principle vulnerable to our attack.
In recent works, the scale of BitTorrent measurements
has significantly increased [19, 28, 33]. For example,
Zhang et al. collected 5 million IP addresses in 12 hours
[33], Siganos et al. collected 37 million IPs in 45 days
[28], and Le Blond et al. collected 148 million IPs in
103 days [19]. As noted by Le Blond et al. and more re-
cently by Wolchok et al. [31], being able to continuously
collect the IP addresses is a serious privacy threat in it-
self. In this paper though, we have not only collected
the IP addresses of a large number of BitTorrent users
but we have also identified a significant fraction of these
users.
A security threat noted by Piatek et al. consists in
injecting the IP address of random Internet users into
BitTorrent trackers to falsely implicate them into copy-
right infringement [27]. We note that the ability to map
a targeted person to an IP address significantly wors-
ens this threat because an attacker could also implicate
that particular person into copyright infringement.
As far as we know, we are the first to show that it
is possible to find the identity of BitTorrent users with-
out requesting that information from an ISP. We believe
that this attack introduces a serious potential for black-
mail and phishing attacks.
Verification.
We relied on IP-IDs to verify the identity of BitTor-
rent downloaders. This technique has been used in the
context of passively counting the number of machines
behind a NAT [18] (on a LAN). As far as we know, it has
never been used on the Internet to actively verify that
several applications were running on the same machine.
Alternatively, we could have used remote physical de-
vice fingerprinting [26] but using IP-IDs was simpler
and sufficient for our purpose.
8. CONCLUSION
We have shown that it is possible for an attacker,
with modest resources, to determine the current IP ad-
dress of identified and targeted Skype user (if the user
is currently active). It may be possible to do this for
other real-time communication applications that also
send datagrams directly between caller and callee (such
as MSN Live, QQ, and Google Talk). In the case of
Skype, even if the targeted user is behind a NAT, the at-
tacker can determine the user’s public IP address. Such
an attack could be used for many malicious purposes,
including observing a person’s mobility or linking the
identity of a person to his Internet usage.
We have further shown that by deploying modest re-
sources, it is possible for an attacker to scale this scheme
to not just one user but tens of thousands of users si-
multaneously. A prankster could use this scalable call-
ing scheme to, for example, create a public web site
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which provides the mobility and file-sharing history of
all active Skype users in a city or a country. Parents,
employers, and spouses could then search such a web
site to determine the mobility and file-sharing history
of arbitrary Skype users.
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